

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Security Measures at Airfields

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1. Generally it can be said that all officers and troops are extremely alert against possible espionage and sabotage. In addition, the isolation of air force personnel from the indigenous population is an effective defense against attempts at espionage. The local commanders have considerable latitude in the maintenance of security measures.

Internal Security.

2. The primary weak points in the interior security of Soviet Air Fields are the German employees. Therefore, all of them must submit to a body search upon arrival and before departure. Entrance and exit are restricted to the guard house. All construction and other work areas of German personnel are subject to inspection by special patrols. In addition, special agents are used to observe the employees at work and also to observe them and their families during off duty hours.

Exterior Security.

3. Special guards are usually posted as follows: at planes, especially jet planes, which are normally not stored in hangars; at POL and ammunition dumps; in Doeberitz even in the coal dump; at Hq buildings and Generals' billets. Patrols usually operate inside and outside of the airfield limits, often on bicycles. In some cases the patrols inside the fence operate in pairs. At some airfields such as Rechlin-Laerz, Stendal, and Cottbus, guard towers have been constructed. At Merseburg, where an airfield is under construction and presently occupied by paramilitary police units, six such towers have been built and connected by a telephone circuit. Civilian patrols can be found

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at occupied as well as unoccupied airfields. Sometimes these patrols operate with dogs. At the very densely occupied field in Zerbst civil guards patrol with rifles. They are nominally uniformed by use of arm bands.

Off Limits.

4. Almost in all cases the exterior security measures include an "off limits" area surrounding the air field. The limits of these have undoubtedly once been identified and published in local police regulations but in very few cases are they identified by warning posters. Inside of the area guards shoot without warning. Roads leading through air lanes are often closed to civilian traffic, sometimes permanently, but more often only during heavy air traffic.

Other Measures.

5. Aside from regular agents the Soviets also utilize occasional informers such as innkeepers, barbers, and the like to point out any strangers to the Security Service.

AA Protection.

6. Until now only a few airfields have established organic AA defenses. The Zerbst Airfield has a battery of 57 mm AA guns. In Cottbus AA positions have been prepared in the vicinity of the AA barracks. There are also numerous old German AA installations such as gun towers, observation towers, warning installations, etc., which have not yet been destroyed and could be put into operation on short notice. It may also be assumed that the independent AA units, which during garrison duty are charged with protection of air installations, bridges, etc., are also responsible for the protection of airfields in their area. (See Brandenburg/Havel) In addition it may be assumed that the fighter command has a complete air warning system, including radar guidance of fighter units. Simple air warning equipment has been observed in position at Finowfurth and Wittenberg. It also can be taken for granted that the German paramilitary police units will in the future establish a civil air warning system. It has been noted, for instance, that motorized fire fighting equipment was assigned to the paramilitary police. The vehicles observed in Stendal are newly overhauled and of special air raid types. Nevertheless it can be stated that at present most Soviet Zone air installations are extremely vulnerable to air attack. Despite all the hectic construction programs that are under way in the Soviet Zone, it has been noted that practically all the airfields lack the very intricate cover systems which are necessary to protect installations against the tactics of modern air warfare.

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